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The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market
between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek
expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP.
This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and
capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in ﬁeld development costs and export market
access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs
of Gazprom's queue of greenﬁeld developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be
compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to ﬁll the
gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive
market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in
which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each
other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulﬁlled than in the past.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Russia possesses nearly a quarter of the world's proven natural
gas reserves and produces around 18% of world output, second
only to the US (BP, 2012; IEA, 2012). Historically, the bulk of
Russia's gas production came from the West Siberian area of
Nadym-Pur-Taz, which provided some 85% of the country's pro-
duction in the 1990s and early 2000s (Mitrova, 2009). Today, the
region's three major ﬁelds—Urengoyskoe, Yamburgskoe and Med-
vezhe—are in steady decline. Nonetheless, Russia's ofﬁcial Energy
Strategy projects that Russian consumption will grow from about
450 to 600 BCM and that demand for Russian exports will increaseublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
r the terms of the Creative
tricted use, distribution, and
thor and source are credited.
. Lunden),
pi.no (I. Overland).by 40% in the period 2010–2030 (Energy Strategy Institute, 2009).
In contrast, the IEA's World Energy Outlook provides more moder-
ate estimates, as shown in Fig. 1. However, implied exports are
relatively similar in the two estimates, indicating that the Energy
Strategy is counting on domestic demand to drive production
growth.
Gazprom, while responsible for around two thirds of total
Russian natural gas extraction, is facing some tough decisions:
its top-producing ﬁelds are in decline; domestic prices, though
rising, have failed to reach netback parity; and the company is
obliged to ensure that the needs of the domestic market are
covered. Historically the price gap between exports to Europe and
Russian domestic prices has been wide, allowing Gazprom to
cross-subsidize the domestic market with revenues from Eur-
opean exports (Spanjer, 2006). Today, with its queue of greenﬁeld
development projects growing more costly, this model looks
increasingly unsustainable. The futility of proceeding with this
strategy is ampliﬁed by downward pressure on prices in Western
Europe from expanding North American shale gas supply, newreserved.
Fig. 1. Russian production, demand and net export forecasts.
Sources: Energy Strategy Institute (2009) and World Energy Outlook ‘New Policies
Scenario’ (IEA, 2010).
Table 1
Russia's gas balance 2010, in BCMn.
Supply Consumption (UGSS)
Gazprom 459 Domestic 414
NGPs 130 Exports to FSU 56
Imports 33 Other exports 144
n Note: Figures for supply and consumption do not tally, because some gas is
used for transportation. Local utilization outside the Uniﬁed Gas Supply System
(UGSS) is not included in consumption; and calculating the exact proportion of gas
in storage originating in different production years is difﬁcult. Methodology from
Stern (2009).
Sources: BP (2010), Gazprom (2011b).
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Fig. 2. Gazprom's production forecast.
Source: based on visual interpretation of Gazprom, 2012b, p. 9.
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tion from other domestic gas producers.
Furthermore, Gazprom's leverage over its second traditional
source of supply, Central Asian gas, was weakened when a second
export channel opened up, crossing from Turkmenistan through
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China (Orttung and Overland, 2011).
When and if (as seems likely) a second leg is added to this
pipeline, bringing it from 40 BCM to 65 BCM per year, Russia's
bargaining position will be further weakened (RIA Novosti, 2012).
After two decades of prickly relations with Russia, Turkmenistan
seems determined to diversify away from its dependence on
Russian export pipelines.
Table 1 gives an overview of the Russian gas balance for 2010,
clearly showing the importance of both Gazprom relative to other
sources of supply and the domestic market compared to other
markets. Since 2010, other companies, including oil companies
producing associated gas and the independent gas companies,
have expanded their share of domestic production. Some of the
latter are partly connected with Gazprom, although the alliances
are constantly shifting and can be difﬁcult to pin down. In this
article we follow established usage, and refer to these companies
as ‘non-Gazprom producers’ (NGPs).
Greater fuel diversity of domestic gas supply has been pro-
moted by improving third-party access to the Russian gas grid, the
Uniﬁed Gas Supply System (UGSS) (Henderson, 2013; Pirani, 2011),
as well as by Russian domestic price reform (the long-heralded
convergence with the European netback price) (Dansie et al., 2010;
Overland and Kutschera, 2011). But the latter also implies a
gradual decline in Gazprom's preference for European exports
over domestic sales as the proﬁtability of the domestic market
begins to approach that of Europe (Lunden and Fjærtoft, 2011).
Regarding exports, the Russian authorities are understandably
reluctant to let Russian gas compete with itself in foreign markets.
In fact, it has been estimated that, through dual pricing, Russia
kept its GDP some 2% higher than would otherwise have been the
case in the past (Tarr and Thomson, 2004). A key aspect of the
system is Gazprom's monopoly on exports outside the former
Soviet Union, enshrined in law in 2006. In addition, it has enjoyed
de facto control over the gas grid within Russia through its
exclusive ownership of all trunk pipelines in the country, which
it has used in several ways to limit NGP growth (Henderson, 2013).
The relation between domestic and foreign prices and Gazprom's
evolving relative market power abroad and at home creates an
important backdrop for our assessment of Russian supply-mix
dynamics below.
Section 2 analyses Gazprom's future production and invest-
ment projections as well as past patterns of capital expenditure.
Section 3 provides background information on the NGPs in general
and Rosneft and Novatek in particular; and in Section 4 we offersome explanations for supply dynamics and allocations between
the NGPs and Gazprom. Section 5 examines non-economic factors
that may play a role in this picture, and Section 6 concludes the
article.2. Gazprom's production decline dilemma: market share vs.
proﬁtability
Historically, the three ﬁelds Medvezhye, Urengoy and Yamburg
have made up the bulk of Gazprom's production (Söderbergh et al.,
2010). However, as shown in Fig. 2, in the coming 10–20 years an
increasing share of Gazprom's production will have to come from
new ﬁelds. Recent developments such as Yen-Yakhinskoe, South
Russkoe and West Pestsovoe in the Nadym-Pur-Taz area, which
have all come on-stream since 2005, are relatively cost-efﬁcient,
being located close to the existing pipeline grid and other infra-
structure (Henderson, 2010). But they are not large enough to
compensate for the decline in Gazprom's three core assets. Thus,
the much larger Shtokman and Yamal developments will have to
provide the bulk of new production capacity, by adding 70 and
200 BCM per year, respectively (Gazprom, 2011b).
As Fig. 3 shows, investments in the development of Shtokman
and Yamal are forecast to account for over 40% of Gazprom's total
expected capital expenditure over the next 20 years. Although
Shtokman has been shelved at least for the time being due to
relatively low gas prices and high costs, the project may still be
resuscitated during the coming decades, depending on develop-
ments in unconventional gas and the supply–demand picture.
Meanwhile, work on the largest ﬁeld on the Yamal Peninsula,
Bovanenkovo, is forging ahead. In any case, the complexity of
these projects drives high ﬁeld development costs, which in turn
require a high gas price in order to be proﬁtable.
 Structure of CAPEX by business 
segment (average annual)  
Structure of CAPEX by major project    
(2011-2030) in total  
700-900 bln RR p.a. 
Fig. 3. Gazprom's CAPEX forecast (data from Gazprom, 2011c).
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transport capacity, but also to maintain the existing grid, which
suffers from severe decay. Forecasts for oil and gas projects should
be treated with caution, since they are often too optimistic
(Emhjellen et al., 2001). This is especially true in the Arctic, where
most of the greenﬁeld projects are located. Although the Bova-
nenkovo project currently seems to be proceeding successfully, the
Shtokman (gas and condensate) and Prirazlomnoe (oil) projects
are two examples of high-proﬁle projects where Gazprom plans
and deadlines have repeatedly proven unrealistic.
Fig. 4 shows a stable relationship between Gazprom's revenue
and capital expenditure. In determining investment levels, Gaz-
prom apparently relies more on budgets and short-term metrics
than expected future market conditions. In contrast, Novatek's
CAPEX-over-revenue ratio is much more volatile. If the trend
observed between 2003 and 2010 holds, Gazprom will respond
to a low-price environment by holding back investments in new
capacity, thus falling short of the investment levels required to
supply the projected volumes. Gazprom had to revise its 2012
budget, reducing capital investments from RUB 1.3 trillion to RUB
710 billion (Mazneva, 2011; Gazprom, 2011c). In 2013 and 2014,
the company foresees substantially increasing investments, and
plans to spend some RUB 4 trillion during the entire period 2012–
2014 (Mazneva, 2011). Consequently, the budget for 2013–15 is
scheduled to run at a deﬁcit of RUB 670 billion, which furtherunderscores the urgency of these investments. If, however, under-
lying assumptions on prices and volumes fail, as they apparently
have for 2012, there may be reason to doubt whether Gazprom
will manage to maintain this schedule.
Energy Strategy production forecasts rely heavily on keeping
the schedules for development of both Shtokman and Yamal.
The Bovanenkovo ﬁeld, the ﬁrst major project on the Yamal
Peninsula, came on-stream in June 2012 (Gazprom, 2012a). The
ﬁeld is expected to increase production from its initial capacity of
30–115 BCM by 2017. For Bovanenkovo, much of the investment is
sunk costs and the production schedule is therefore relatively
robust. For Shtokman, however, the ﬁnal investment decision was
ﬁrst delayed numerous times, then postponed until after the 2012
presidential elections, in the hope of gaining further tax conces-
sions (Shtokman, 2011). On 1 July 2012, the joint venture agree-
ment between Gazprom and its foreign partners expired; and a
few months later the project was ofﬁcially halted for the time
being (Amiel and Landauro, 2012). These mega-projects represent
the very core of the Russian gas future, so delays and ambiguities
in decision-making on investments give rise to concerns about
future security of supply. But these projects are not the only
contributors to Gazprom's production forecast: even if both
Bovanenkovo and (less likely) Shtokman proceed as planned, other
projects further east as well as in the Ob-Taz Bay are planned to
deliver 150 BCM by 2020 and 230 BCM by 2030 (Pirani, 2011).
If these fall off the radar due to prioritization of Yamal and
Shtokman, that would of course trigger similar worries concerning
future production. In sum, if Gazprom should fail to deliver on its
projections, there should be room to expand NGP output, as long
as overall demand is sufﬁciently high.3. Non-Gazprom production
The Energy Strategy foresees non-Gazprom production rising
from a share of 17% in 2008 to 25–30% by 2030, implying growth
from 114 to about 245 BCM/year.
The NGPs have an estimated total reserve base of some
9800 BCM, while Gazprom's total reserves are about 33,000 BCM
(Henderson, 2010). Based on 2009 production, the reserves-to-
production ratio (R/P ratio) of the NGPs was over 80 years,
whereas Gazprom's ratio was approximately 72 years. Some
sources claim that the NGPs could double, or perhaps even triple,
their production relatively quickly (e.g. Henderson, 2013, pp. 13–
14), outpacing the Energy Strategy estimates.
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In 2009, apart from Gazprom there were in Russia some 20 gas
producers with annual production above 1 BCM. Of these, 14 were
oil companies producing associated gas, of which eight were
Russian.
After the gas company Novatek, the oil companies Lukoil,
Rosneft and TNK-BP hold the largest reserves of Russia's NGPs
(see Fig. 5). Their estimated gas resources total some 3880 BCM, or
about 24.4 billion BOE (barrels of oil equivalent). Importantly, a
large share of these resources is associated gas that requires only
relatively modest investments to be developed if it is located close
to the pipeline grid. Lukoil, Rosneft and TNK-BP are also three of
Russia's greatest ﬂarers—alone ﬂaring a total of 19 BCM in 2011 by
ofﬁcial accounts; the true ﬁgure is probably higher (Loe and
Ladehaug, 2012). These companies thus have signiﬁcant supply
that could be pushed into the pipeline grid relatively easily—
implying marginal costs much lower than greenﬁeld develop-
ments. (However, Gazprom-Neft was Russia's second-largest gas
ﬂarer in 2011, which suggests that, in addition to the pipeline-
access issues of other companies, economic considerations may be
hindering this gas from reaching the market.)
Still, the resource base of the oil companies is probably the
easiest to develop, if they have access to markets. Accordingly,
TNK-BP plans to double its gas production to 30 BCM by 2020
(Akin, 2011). TNK-BP's head of gas sales has even stated that
domestic gas sales may prove more proﬁtable than oil exports by
2014, due to relatively low levels of taxation (see Henderson,
2011).3.2. Rosneft's growing role in the Russian gas sector
On 12 December 2012, Rosneft agreed to buy Access-Alfa-
Renova's 50% stake in TNK-BP (Rosneft, 2012). This followed an
agreement with BP to buy its 50% stake in TNK-BP. Both deals,
ﬁnalized in March 2013, serve not only to increase Rosneft's oil
production, but also boost its gas production to roughly the same
size as Novatek (Weaver, 2012). Importantly, on 1 November 2012,
Rosneft, in competition with Novatek, snapped up a contract to
supply Inter RAO with 35 BCM per year on average over the next
25 years: this indicates the growing clout of Rosneft on the
domestic gas market.
Rosneft enjoys strong political backing and is not afraid of
challenging Gazprom either. As detailed by Henderson (2013),
several of the country's top political actors, including President
Putin, have made repeated public calls for a loosening of Gaz-
prom's grip on the UGSS (see also Rosneft, 2012).0
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Fig. 5. Gas Reserves of the Largest Russian Oil Companies in 2010.
Sources: company data, published reserves estimates (Rosneft, 2010; Lukoil, 2011;
TNK-BP, 2010).3.3. Novatek and the other NGPs
Russia's second-largest gas producer, Novatek, is one of the
world's ﬁve largest gas companies by reserves and stood for half of
the new NGP supply contracts with Russian buyers signed during
2012 (Henderson, 2013, p. 25). We therefore examine Novatek in
some detail here.
Fig. 6 shows how Novatek's production and market shares have
been growing steadily. In 2006, the company produced roughly
30 BCM of gas. By 2010, production had grown to 37.2 BCM, and in
2011 to 52.9 BCM—an impressive year-on-year growth of 42%
(Gyetvay, 2012). In 2010, Novatek supplied 13% of the domestic
market and accounted for 32% of NGP production (Madick, 2011).
Novatek during the period 2009–2011 enjoyed a whopping
600% replacement ratio, through organic growth as well as its
acquisition of SeverEnergia, Sibneftegas and Northgaz. At year-end
2012 the company's R/P ratio was 30 years (Gyetvay, 2013). Total
reserves amount to some 9.4 billion BOE utilizing SEC (Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission) methodology (Novatek, 2012).
In comparison, Statoil has about 5.4 billion BOE and Total some
11.4 billion BOE (Statoil, 2010, 2011). Here it should be noted that
SEC methodology is on the conservative side: the real potential of
Novatek—especially based on its development portfolio, not
included in the SEC methodology—is signiﬁcantly greater than
this. Applying the PRMS (Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007)
standard, the potential is some 13.4 billion BOE (Madick, 2011).
Regarding dry sales gas, Novatek operates only in the domestic
market, which is characterized by artiﬁcially low prices. Never-
theless, even without the gas export channel, Novatek has shown
it can outperform Gazprom. Novatek's EBITDA (earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and net proﬁt
margin in 2011 were 49% and 32%, respectively, while Gazprom
secured 14% and 28% including both domestic and foreign revenue
(Kruglov, 2012). This cannot be explained by Novatek's formal
ability to charge higher prices domestically. In 2010, Novatek's
average sales price was only at a 1% premium to the regulated
price charged by Gazprom, and by 2012 Novatek's price was
actually slightly lower than that of Gazprom, and the company
was still making a ﬁne proﬁt (Henderson, 2013, p. 17; see also
Henderson, 2011).
The potential for future production growth in the domestic
market is slightly more ambiguous. The largest ﬁeld development
project in terms of reserves is the Yamal LNG project, but gas from
this ﬁeld will be exported rather than used to supply the domestic
market. An agreement with Gazprom Export on LNG transporta-
tion has already been signed, allegedly with Gazprom Export
receiving a 1% fee (Kristalinskaya, 2011). The remaining reserves,
totaling some 500 MBOE, are divided between several smaller
ﬁelds and have a positive but limited potential for production0
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L.P. Lunden et al. / Energy Policy 61 (2013) 663–670 667growth. On the other hand, Novatek has been active in acquiring
shares in three companies, Sibneftneftegaz, SeverEnergia and
Northgaz, thus turning to acquisition as a complement to orga-
nic growth. Moreover, as noted above, if the PRMS standard is
applied, the production potential of Novatek increases by over
5 billion BOE.
To summarize, Novatek seems capable of expanding its asset
base by utilizing spare capacity, maturing its exploration portfolio
and pursuing active portfolio management. Combined with the
reserves of associated gas of the oil companies, believed to be able
to double or perhaps even triple their production (Henderson,
2010), there seems to be ample opportunity for the NGPs to
increase their already growing production. A key question then
is: what will happen if the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs
become increasingly misaligned?
Apart from Novatek, Itera has been the most prominent among
the non-oil company NGPs. However, Itera's two main assets are
controlled by joint ventures 51% owned by Gazprom. Itera's
position is further complicated by the signing of a large joint
venture with Rosneft, the purchase of 6% of Itera's stock by Rosneft
and statements by Rosneft that it intended to buy 51% of Itera in
2012 (Reuters 2012; Upstream 2012). Another company, Northgaz,
is 51% Gazprom-owned, making its ‘independence’ somewhat
limited, while Novatek bought a 49% stake in the same company
at the end of 2012 (Interfax, 2012). The remaining three compa-
nies, Norilskgazprom, Yakutkgazprom and Taimyrgaz, operate only
in off-grid environments supplying monotowns isolated from the
UGSS and thus do not inﬂuence domestic market dynamics.0
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Source: Madick, 2011.4. NGP–Gazprom dynamics
4.1. Mutual interest in increased NGP production
Assuming that Gazprom production decreases as a result of lack
of investment due to low revenue ﬂows—i.e. assuming that the
relation in Fig. 4 above holds—NGP action will be required to cover
domestic market demand, in order for Gazprom to be able to fulﬁll
export projections. In fact, NGPs have ﬁlled out the domestic
market, enabling Gazprom to supply gas to Europe without having
to develop new, high-cost production. As Gazprom's old giants in
the Nadym-Pur-Taz region decline, this tendency may be rein-
forced. It could thus be in Gazprom's own interest to allow for
higher NGP production in production-quota negotiations with the
government, when the marginal cost of Gazprom's production is
higher than marginal revenues in the domestic market. According
to this logic, Gazprom would allocate its volumes by ﬁrst optimiz-
ing exports, and thereafter observing its cost curves and allocating
domestic supplies. Importantly, if marginal revenues for the NGPs
are higher than their marginal costs, they would gladly let
Gazprom off the hook by supplying volumes to the domestic
market, thus letting Gazprom focus on proﬁt-generating activities
abroad and at home.
Fig. 7 shows a stylized model of Gazprom and NGP volume
allocation. Following a dialog with the government, a quantity Q1
to be supplied at price P1 is determined. Volumes above that are
cleared via market mechanisms, being formally classiﬁed as excess
quota gas [sverkhlimitny gaz]. Gazprom, having made the most
of its opportunities in the European market, observes that
its marginal cost (MCGAZ) is above the regulated price at the
prescribed volume, and tries to reduce its supply toward Q2.
The NGPs, who put substantial volumes into the market only
when Gazprom has had its ﬁll, start at a much earlier stage of their
marginal cost curves (illustrated by MCNGP starting at Q2) and, as
argued above, can be induced to supply the delta (Q1−Q2). There-
upon, Gazprom may supply the demand that surpasses the quota[sverkhlimitnyy rynok] until the point where MCGAZ intercepts
demand (D). The extent of volumes supplied by Gazprom vs. the
NGPs depends on the de facto monopoly power of Gazprom and
thus the ability of the NGPs to market their volumes freely. In a
totally free market, the market clearing price would be found in
the intersection between MCNGP and D. However, in the speciﬁc
Russian market, the remaining volumes would be sold at differing
prices, depending on the slopes of Gazprom's marginal revenue
curve and the cost curves of both the NGPs and Gazprom.
The market clears at the intersection of MCNGP and D.
Fig. 7 reveals two arguments for why the NGPs may be willing
to expand gas production and, importantly, why Gazprom may
welcome this. Firstly, since the NGP cost curves are likely to start
at a lower cost base on the margin than that of Gazprom, the
volumes the NGPs put into the market imply lower marginal cost,
even with similar overall cost functions. Secondly, allowing the
NGPs to act on the regulated volume gives Gazprom the opportu-
nity not only to avoid losing money in the regulated market, but
also to gain a larger margin in the market for excess consumption.
Whether or not NGPs can supply the domestic market on behalf of
Gazprom will depend heavily on the slopes of their marginal cost
curves relative to that of Gazprom. Estimates on future levels and
their elasticities are not available. However, inferences can be
made from Fig. 8, which shows that Novatek has the lowest
L.P. Lunden et al. / Energy Policy 61 (2013) 663–670668expenditure and highest converted production in the peer group.
Thus, Novatek should be well positioned to take larger shares of
the domestic market, provided that they can continue their history
of successful organic growth. Most of Novatek's licenses are
located close to existing pipeline grids, making the associated
development costs lower than those of the remote Gazprom
mega-projects, which require heavy pipeline investments in addi-
tion to ﬁeld development expenditures.
Thus far, we have analyzed the behavior of Gazprom based on
the assumption of a short-sighted investment strategy driven by
current budget metrics. However, the incentives may still hold in
the case of an investment strategy based on more forward-looking
price expectations. A far-sighted Gazprom could also be happy to
allow Novatek (and others) a growing share of the domestic
market. Since Gazprom's development projects are deemed costly,
and the development portfolio of the NGPs relatively cheap,
Gazprom might prefer to delay its investments in new develop-
ments, and welcome the independents to increase production for
the domestic market. This could be driven by the marginal cost/
revenue dynamics above: but it could also be generated by an
inter-temporal optimization whereby Gazprom foresees higher
future export prices and opts to wait rather than crowd out
cheaper NGP production.
That said, the effects examined so far do depend on low
domestic prices. Marginal revenue in Russia is determined by
the domestic prices that have been kept at artiﬁcially low levels by
the authorities, and are most probably lower than the marginal
costs of Gazprom. As shown in Lunden and Fjærtoft (2011), the
domestic price does not impact short-term supply, only relative
shares of production. Consequently, although Gazprom may con-
cede a greater share to the NGPs now, Gazprom is likely to strive to
regain market shares once prices begin to increase. The NGPs are
thus faced with a dilemma: on the one hand they would like
market prices for gas to increase, so as to increase revenues; on the
other hand, that would whet Gazprom's appetite for selling
domestically, entailing the risk of decreasing their market share.
A possible indication of a deliberate Gazprom attitude towards
volume allocations is the fact that Novatek has a tradition of making
predictions based on production capacity rather than actual produc-
tion (Henderson, 2010). This ﬁts nicely with a strategy of cooperat-
ing rather than competing with Gazprom: Gazprom knows the
capacity of Novatek and can accordingly plan its allocation between
domestic and foreign markets, allowing Novatek to ﬁll any gap.4.2. Over-supply and increased third party access, how strong is
Gazprom's bargaining position?
As shown above, both the oil companies and Novatek seem
ready to produce an increasing share of the Russian market, and
Gazprom in some circumstances could welcome gas from other
companies. We now turn to the implications of over-supply and
reduced Gazprom bargaining power.
As the decision to develop the Bovanenkovo ﬁeld has already
been made, and deviation from the planned production increase
schedule seems unlikely, Russia may be faced with excess gas
supply if the NGPs increase production simultaneously. The con-
sequences for the Russian gas market will depend on Gazprom's
ability to retain or regain its power to exclude others from the
UGSS. As can be inferred from the discussion above, and in line
with logic of the past, if Gazprom's marginal cost decreases as
investments turn to sunk costs, Gazprom would simply deny
market access for NGPs. However, even though Gazprom may still
have some scope for opaque approval processes and Rosneft
(2013) still complains publically of discretionary access treatment,
many signs point to increasing access to the UGSS for third parties.Importantly, the courts have several times supported NGPs in
claims against Gazprom (Henderson, 2013).
Given over-supply and transparent access to the UGSS, the
allocation of domestic volumes between Gazprom and the NGPs
will depend on the relative marginal costs of the various ﬁelds of
the companies. In other words, the marginal cost curves in Fig. 7
will merge. Gazprom, as before, will ﬁrst optimize its export
allocation and thereafter decide on a volume to supply in the
excess consumption market. However, this volume will be lower
than before, once the opportunity to sell gas at the intersection of
the marginal revenue curve and marginal cost curve is gone.
Volume allocation will now work as in any other competitive
market: companies with less costly ﬁelds will have an advantage,
since they can offer gas at lower prices while still making a proﬁt.
As indicated by Henderson (2013), the Russian gas market is now
more open for competition, since the prices offered by the NGPs
are roughly on par with regulated prices (Rosneft, 2013). Increased
efﬁciency in the gas market ensues that cheaper gas is
produced ﬁrst.
The Russian economy would obviously stand to beneﬁt from
this situation. However, that will not necessarily lead to corre-
sponding tax revenues for the Russian government, as the tax is
largely calculated on the basis of gross revenue rather than proﬁts.
Further assessing the optimal outcome for the Russian economy,
Gazprom's export monopoly comes into question. Although there
is little incentive to have Russian gas compete with Russian gas in
foreign markets, this does not necessarily entail that the export
monopoly should belong to Gazprom. Instead, an independent
organization, perhaps owned by the gas-producing companies,
could purchase gas domestically and sell gas externally.
That would ensure that the cheapest gas is produced ﬁrst while
simultaneously harvesting revenues from avoiding Russian-to-
Russian competition in foreign markets. Suggestions of stripping
Gazprom of its export monopoly have been relatively rare, but
some examples exist (see Henderson, 2013).5. Powerful interests stimulate increased competition
Although the analysis in Section 4.1 describes a situation where
Gazprom could have encouraged increased NGP production, other
events suggest that NGP advances may have occurred without
Gazprom's blessing. In 2009, in the midst of the ﬁnancial crisis,
Gazprom production decreased by 16%, while that of Novatek
increased by 8% (Henderson, 2010). This might be due to the
marginal cost and revenue dynamics described above, but another
explanation is also probable: Novatek and other NGPs are set on
increasing their market share, whether Gazprom likes it or not.
The rapid growth of Novatek correlates neatly with the entry of
the powerful tycoon Gennady Timchenko into its boardroom.
Volga Resources, controlled by Timchenko, ﬁrst acquired a 5.07%
stake in 2008, which grew to 18.2% in 2009. At the same time, a
51% stake in Tambeyneftegas, which owned the license for South
Tambeyskoye (the ‘Yamal LNG project’) was sold to Novatek by
Volga Resources. Timchenko's share in Novatek subsequently
increased to 23.1% (Overland et al., 2011). In addition, the fact that
the political elite have endorsed the deals between Total and
Novatek on both Yamal LNG and Novatek shares indicates the
expanding political clout of Novatek's stakeholders (Overland
et al., 2011). And Novatek's success in securing tax breaks for the
Yamal LNG project far in advance of the investment decision
indicates that its management is well-connected. The Yamal LNG
project has also received support from the government in the form
of preparation of port infrastructure at Sabetta as well as approach
and seaway channels for LNG tankers (Mikhelson, 2011). In stark
contrast, Gazprom's Shtokman project has yet to secure the ﬁscal
L.P. Lunden et al. / Energy Policy 61 (2013) 663–670 669conditions deemed necessary for an investment decision to
be made.
Political support for the NGPs has not been limited to Novatek.
After Putin returned to his third presidency, Igor Sechin assumed
the position of CEO of Rosneft; he also heads the inﬂuential
Presidential Commission for Strategic Development of the Fuel
and Energy Sector and Environmental Security, and has been an
advocate of the interests of the NGPs. While Sechin was chairman,
Rosneft ﬁled a high-proﬁle complaint to the Antimonopoly Ser-
vice, accusing Gazprom of discriminating against independent
companies in the allocation of pipeline capacity (Henderson,
2010). Moreover, Sechin reportedly dislikes Gazprom CEO Alexey
Miller personally and has for years pushed for increased third-
party pipeline access (Wikileaks, 2008).
The resulting situation is paradoxical. Powerful political actors
connected with Rosneft (like Sechin) are generally associated with
an ideology of statism, but advocate liberalization of the gas sector.
The actors associated with Gazprom, including former Chairman of
the Gazprom Board Dmitry Medvedev, are generally associated
with a more liberal economic ideology, and yet Gazprom has been
trying to ﬁght off liberalization in the gas sector.
Progress in market liberalization also points in the direction of
increased NGP inﬂuence. On New Year's Eve 2010, Prime Minister
Putin issued Decree no. 1205 ‘On Improvement of State Regulation
of Gas Prices’, which built on Decree no. 333 from 2007 ‘Concerning
the Improvement of the State Regulation of Gas Prices’ (Pirani,
2011). The 2010 decree signaled a shift from government-regulated
domestic prices to state-regulated tariffs in the UGSS, implying a
greater focus on equal access. However, progress in implementing
the 2007 decree has been slow, and there is no guarantee that the
2010 decree will be effectuated either. Nevertheless, the wording in
the latter does indicate greater bargaining power for the NGPs in
their relations with Gazprom.
A heightened focus on ﬂaring could also help the NGPs to
promote their interests. Russia ﬂares more gas than any other
country in the world: it reportedly wasted some 35 BCM in 2010
(Interfax, 2011). To cope with the problem, the Russian authorities
decided to limit ﬂaring to 5% by the end of 2012. However, in order
to achieve this goal, the previously ﬂared gas will need an
evacuation route—which means access to the UGSS.6. Conclusions
The tide is turning for Gazprom. Although domestic prices have
risen steadily, and sufﬁciently for Gazprom to make a slight proﬁt
in the domestic market using its current producing ﬁelds, price
reform seems to fall short (bar the already approved Bovanenkovo
development) of supporting the soaring costs of Gazprom's new
ﬁeld developments needed to compensate for reduced output
from the Nadym-Pur-Taz area. In contrast, the NGPs have sub-
stantial potential to ﬁll the gap and are queuing up to do so—and
apparently with growing government support.
This process is further supported by industrial economics. The
NGP portfolios are cheaper to develop compared to those of
Gazprom, and, if they continue gaining market access, can supply
greater volumes than in the past.
Gazprom can, to the extent it can control access to the UGSS,
dictate the market shares of the other producers. Normally, losing
market shares is not a good thing—but in the special environment
of Russia's domestic market, it could be in Gazprom's interest to
lessen its own domestic dominance. First, in the short term, the
company could welcome increased NGP production so as not to
lose out on export revenues as well as suffering loss of reputation
abroad. Second, even a far-sighted Gazprom might be willing to
yield market shares to the NGPs if its own development portfolioproves too expensive compared to the marginal revenues to be
obtained.
In fact, the domestic presence of the NGPs is likely to increase
whether Gazprom likes it or not. The political leverage of Novatek
and Rosneft is rising, and more and more pro-NGP legislation is
being passed. In order to be implemented, the ban on ﬂaring will
have to be accompanied by market access and further progress on
non-discriminatory UGSS access. Moreover, with Gazprom's access
to cheap Central Asian gas gradually declining, the NGPs stand out
as the only alternative.
The NGPs market share seems set to continue increasing—and,
as this article has shown, that may even be in Gazprom's interest.
Most likely Gazpromwill resist relinquishing its monopoly powers
entirely, so that it can limit NGP production in the future, but
Gazprom's bargaining power will be under attack from all sides
as its supply portfolio loses out to cheaper NGP production.
For Russia Inc., it makes sense to develop the most economical
resources ﬁrst.Acknowledgments
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